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We analyze cosmology assuming unitary quantum mechanics, using a tripartite partition into
system, observer and environment degrees of freedom. This generalizes the second law of thermo-
dynamics to “The system’s entropy can’t decrease unless it interacts with the observer, and it can’t
increase unless it interacts with the environment.” The former follows from the quantum Bayes
Theorem we derive. We show that because of the long-range entanglement created by cosmological
inflation, the cosmic entropy decreases exponentially rather than linearly with the number of bits of
information observed, so that a given observer can reduce entropy by much more than the amount
of information her brain can store. Indeed, we argue that as long as inflation has occurred in a
non-negligible fraction of the volume, almost all sentient observers will find themselves in a post-
inflationary low-entropy Hubble volume, and we humans have no reason to be surprised that we do
so as well, which solves the so-called inflationary entropy problem. An arguably worse problem for
unitary cosmology involves gamma-ray-burst constraints on the “Big Snap”, a fourth cosmic dooms-
day scenario alongside the “Big Crunch”, “Big Chill” and “Big Rip”, where an increasingly granular
nature of expanding space modifies our life-supporting laws of physics. Our tripartite framework also
clarifies when the popular quantum gravity approximation Gµν ≈ 8piG〈Tµν〉 is valid, and how prob-
lems with recent attempts to explain dark energy as gravitational backreaction from super-horizon
scale fluctuations can be understood as a failure of this approximation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The spectacular progress in observational cosmology
over the past decade has established cosmological infla-
tion [1–4] as the most popular theory for what happened
early on. Its popularity stems from the perception that it
elegantly explains certain observed properties of our uni-
verse that would otherwise constitute extremely unlikely
fluke coincidences, such as why it is so flat and uniform,
and why there are 10−5-level density fluctuations which
appear adiabatic, Gaussian, and almost scale-invariant
[5–7].
If a scientific theory predicts a certain outcome with
probability below 10−6, say, then we say that the the-
ory is ruled out at 99.9999% confidence if we nonethe-
less observe this outcome. In this sense, the classic Big
Bang model without inflation is arguably ruled out at
extremely high significance. For example, generic initial
conditions consistent with our existence 13.7 Billion years
later predict observed cosmic background fluctuations
that are about 105 times larger than we actually observe
[8] — the so-called horizon problem [1]. In other words,
without inflation, the initial conditions would have to be
highly fine-tuned to match our observations.
However, the case for inflation is not yet closed, even
aside from issues to do with measurements [9], compet-
ing theories [10–12] and the so-called measure problem
[8, 13–33]. In particular, it has been argued that the so-
called “entropy problem” invalidates claims that inflation
is a successful theory. This “entropy problem” was ar-
ticulated by Penrose even before inflation was invented
[34], and has recently been clarified in an important body
of work by Carroll and collaborators [35, 36]. The basic
problem is to explain why our early universe had such
low entropy, with its matter highly uniform rather than
clumped into huge black holes. The conventional answer
holds that inflation is an attractor solution, such that
a broad class of initial conditions lead to essentially the
same inflationary outcome, thus replacing the embarrass-
ing need to explain extremely unusual initial conditions
by the less embarrassing need to explain why our initial
conditions were in the broad class supporting inflation.
However, [36] argues that the entropy must have been
at least as low before inflation as after it ended, so that
inflation fails to make our state seem less unnatural or
fine-tuned. This follows from the mapping between initial
states and final states being invertible, corresponding to
Liouville’s theorem in classical mechanics and unitarity
in quantum mechanics.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the en-
tropy problem in unitary quantum mechanics more thor-
oughly. We will see that this fundamentally transforms
the problem, strengthening the case for inflation. A sec-
ondary goal is to explore other implications of unitary
cosmology, for example by clarifying when the popular
approximation Gµν ≈ 8piG〈Tµν〉 is and is not valid. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe a quantitative formalism for computing the
quantum state and its entropy in unitary cosmology. We
apply this formalism to the inflationary entropy problem
in Section III and discuss implications in Section IV. De-
tails regarding the “Big Snap” scenario are covered to
Appendix B.
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2FIG. 1: Because of chaotic dynamics, a single early-universe
quantum state |ψ〉 typically evolves into a quantum superpo-
sition of many macroscopically different states, some of which
correspond to a large semiclassical post-inflationary universe
like ours (each with its galaxies etc. in different places), and
others which do not and completely lack observers.
II. SUBJECT, OBJECT & ENVIRONMENT
A. Unitary Cosmology
The key assumption underlying the entropy problem is
that quantum mechanics is unitary, so we will make this
assumption throughout the present paper1. As described
in [40], this suggests the history schematically illustrated
in Figure 1: a wavefunction describing an early universe
quantum state (illustrated by the fuzz at the far left)
will evolve deterministically according to the Schro¨dinger
equation into a quantum superposition of not one but
many macroscopically different states, some of which cor-
respond to large semiclassical post-inflationary universes
like ours, and others which do not and completely lack
observers. The argument of [40] basically went as follows:
1. By the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, any ini-
tial state must involve micro-superpositions, micro-
1 The forms of non-unitarity historically invoked to address the
quantum measurement problem tend to make the entropy prob-
lem worse rather than better: both Copenhagen-style wavefunc-
tion collapse [37, 38] and proposed dynamical reduction mecha-
nisms [39] arguably tend to increase the entropy, transforming
pure (zero entropy) quantum states into mixed states, akin to a
form of diffusion process in phase space.
scopic quantum fluctuations in the various fields.
2. Because the ensuing time-evolution involves insta-
bilities (such as the well-known gravitational insta-
bilities that lead to the formation of cosmic large-
scale structure), some of these micro-superpositions
are amplified into macro-superpositions, much like
in Schro¨dinger’s cat example [41]. More generally,
this happens for any chaotic dynamics, where pos-
itive Lyapunov exponents make the outcome expo-
nentially sensitive to initial conditions.
3. The current quantum state of the universe is thus
a superposition of a large number of states that are
macroscopically different (Earth forms here, Earth
forms one meter further north, etc), as well as states
that failed to inflate.
4. Since macroscopic objects inevitably interact with
their surroundings, the well-known effects of deco-
herence will keep observers such as us unaware of
such macro-superpositions.
This shows that with unitary quantum mechanics, the
conventional phrasing of the entropy problem is too
simplistic, since a single pre-inflationary quantum state
evolves into a superposition of many different semiclas-
sical post-inflationary states. The careful and detailed
analysis of the entropy problem in [36] is mainly per-
formed within the context of classical physics, and quan-
tum mechanics is only briefly mentioned, when correctly
stating that Liouville’s theorem holds quantum mechan-
ically too as long as the evolution is unitary. However,
the evolution that is unitary is that of the total quan-
tum state of the entire universe. We unfortunately have
no observational information about this total entropy,
and what we casually refer to as “the” entropy is instead
the entropy we observe for our particular branch of the
wavefunction in Figure 1. We should generally expect
these two entropies to be quite different — indeed, the
entropy of the entire universe may well equal zero, since
if it started in a pure state, unitarity ensures that it is
still in a pure state.
B. Deconstructing the universe
It is therefore interesting to investigate the cosmolog-
ical entropy problem more thoroughly in the context of
unitary quantum mechanics, which we will now do.
Most discussions of quantum statistical mechanics split
the Universe into two subsystems [42]: the object under
consideration and everything else (referred to as the en-
vironment). At a physical level, this “splitting” is simply
a matter of accounting, grouping the degrees of freedom
into two sets: those of the object and the rest. At a
mathematical level, this corresponds to a choice of fac-
torization of the Hilbert space.
As discussed in [43], unitary quantum mechanics can
be even better understood if we include a third subsystem
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FIG. 2: An observer can always decompose the world into
three subsystems: the degrees of freedom corresponding to her
subjective perceptions (the subject), the degrees of freedom
being studied (the object), and everything else (the environ-
ment). As indicated, the subsystem Hamiltonians Hs, Ho,
He and the interaction Hamiltonians Hso, Hoe, Hse can cause
qualitatively very different effects, providing a unified picture
including both decoherence and apparent wave function col-
lapse. Generally, Hoe increases entropy and Hso decreases
entropy.
as well, the subject, thus decomposing the total system
(the entire universe) into three subsystems, as illustrated
in Figure 2:
1. The subject consists of the degrees of freedom as-
sociated with the subjective perceptions of the ob-
server. This does not include any other degrees of
freedom associated with the brain or other parts of
the body.
2. The object consists of the degrees of freedom that
the observer is interested in studying, e.g., the
pointer position on a measurement apparatus.
3. The environment consists of everything else, i.e.,
all the degrees of freedom that the observer is not
paying attention to. By definition, these are the
degrees of freedom that we always perform a partial
trace over.
A related framework is presented in [43, 44]. Note
that the first two definitions are very restrictive. Sup-
pose, for example, that you are measuring a voltage us-
ing one of those old-fashioned multimeters that has an
analog pointer. Then the “object” consists merely of the
single degree of freedom corresponding to the angle of
the pointer, and excludes all of the other ∼ 1027 degrees
of freedom associated with the atoms in the multimeter.
Similarly, the “subject” excludes most of the ∼ 1028 de-
grees of freedom associated with the elementary particles
in your brain. The term “perception” is used in a broad
sense in item 1, including thoughts, emotions and any
other attributes of the subjectively perceived state of the
observer.
Just as with the currently standard bipartite decom-
position into object and environment, this tripartite de-
composition is different for each observer and situation:
the subject degrees of freedom depend on which of the
many observers in our universe is doing the observing,
the object degrees of freedom reflect which physical sys-
tem this observer chooses to study, and the environment
degrees of freedom correspond to everything else. For
example, if you are studying an electron double-slit ex-
periment, electron positions would constitute your object
and decoherence-inducing photons would be part of your
environment, whereas in many quantum optics experi-
ments, photon degrees of freedom are the object while
electrons are part of the environment.
This subject-object-environment decomposition of the
degrees of freedom allows a corresponding decomposition
of the Hamiltonian:
H = Hs +Ho +He +Hso +Hse +Hoe +Hsoe, (1)
where the first three terms operate only within one sub-
system, the second three terms represent pairwise inter-
actions between subsystems, and the third term repre-
sents any irreducible three-way interaction. The practi-
cal usefulness of this tripartite decomposition lies in that
one can often neglect everything except the object and
its internal dynamics (given by Ho) to first order, us-
ing simple prescriptions to correct for the interactions
with the subject and the environment, as summarized in
Table 1. The effects of both Hso and Hoe have been ex-
tensively studied in the literature. Hso involves quantum
measurement, and gives rise to the usual interpretation
of the diagonal elements of the object density matrix as
probabilities. Hoe produces decoherence, selecting a pre-
ferred basis and making the object act classically under
appropriate conditions. Hse, causes decoherence directly
in the subject system. For example, [43] showed that any
qualia or other subjective perceptions that are related to
neurons firing in a human brain will decohere extremely
rapidly, typically on a timescale of order 10−20 seconds,
ensuring that our subjective perceptions will appear clas-
sical. In other words, it is useful to split the Schro¨dinger
equation into pieces: three governing the three parts of
our universe (subject, object and environment), and ad-
ditional pieces governing the interactions between these
parts. Analyzing the effects of these different parts of
the equation, the Ho part gives most of the effects that
our textbooks cover, the Hso part gives Everett’s many
worlds (spreading superpositions from the object to you,
the subject), the Hoe part gives traditional decoherence,
the Hse part gives subject decoherence.
4TABLE I: Summary of three three basic quantum processes discussed in the text
Interaction Dynamics Example Effect Entropy
Object-object ρ 7→ UρU†
(
1 0
0 0
)
7→
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
Unitary evolution Unchanged
Object-environment ρ 7→∑ij PiρPj〈j |i〉
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
7→
(
1
2
0
0 1
2
)
Decoherence Increases
Object-subject ρ 7→ ΠiρΠ
†
i
tr ΠiρΠ†i
, Πi =
∑
j〈si|σj〉Pj
(
1
2
0
0 1
2
)
7→
(
1 0
0 0
)
Observation Decreases
C. Entropy in quantum cosmology
In the context of unitary cosmology, this tripartite de-
composition is useful not merely as a framework for clas-
sifying and unifying different quantum effects, but also
as a framework for understanding entropy and its evolu-
tion. In short, Hoe increases entropy while Hso decreases
entropy, in the sense defined below.
To avoid confusion, it is crucial that we never talk of
the entropy without being clear on which entropy we are
referring to. With three subsystems, there are many in-
teresting entropies to discuss, for example that of the
subject, that of the object, that of the environment and
that of the whole system, all of which will generally be
different from one another. Any given observer can de-
scribe the state of an object of interest by a density ma-
trix ρo which is computed from the full density matrix ρ
in two steps:
1. Tracing: Partially trace over all environment de-
grees of freedom.
2. Conditioning: Condition on all subject degrees of
freedom.
In practice, step 2 often reduces to what textbooks call
“state preparation”, as explained below. When we say
“the entropy” without further qualification, we will refer
to the object entropy So: the standard von Neumann
entropy of this object density matrix ρo, i.e.,
So ≡ −tr ρo log ρo. (2)
Throughout this paper, we use logarithms of base two
so that the entropy has units of bits. Below when we
speak of the information (in bits) that one system (say
the environment) has about another (say the object), we
will refer to the quantum mutual information given by
the standard definition [45–47]
I12 ≡ S1 + S2 − S12, (3)
where S12 is the joint system, while S1 and S1 are the en-
tropies of each subsystem when tracing over the degrees
of freedom of the other.
Let us illustrate all this with a simple example in Fig-
ure 3, where both the subject and object have only a sin-
gle degree of freedom that can take on only a few distinct
values (3 for the subject, 2 for the object). For definite-
ness, we denote the three subject states | -¨ 〉, | ¨^ 〉 and |_¨〉,
and interpret them as the observer feeling neutral, happy
and sad, respectively. We denote the two object states
|↑〉 and |↓〉, and interpret them as the spin component
(“up” or “down”) in the z-direction of a spin-1/2 system,
say a silver atom. The joint system consisting of subject
and object therefore has only 2×3 = 6 basis states: | -¨↑〉,
| -¨ ↓〉, | ¨^ ↑〉, | ¨^ ↓〉, |_¨↑〉, |_¨↓〉. In Figures Figure 3, we
have therefore plotted ρ as a 6 × 6 matrix consisting of
nine two-by-two blocks.
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of the 6 × 6 density matrix for the
basis states | -¨↑〉, | -¨↓〉, | ¨^ ↑〉, | ¨^ ↓〉, |_¨↑〉, |_¨↓〉 as the object
evolves in isolation, then decoheres, then gets observed by the
subject. The final result is a statistical mixture of the states
| ¨^ ↑〉 and |_¨↓〉, simple zero-entropy states like the one we
started with.
51. Effect of Ho: constant entropy
If the object were to evolve during a time interval t
without interacting with the subject or the environment
(Hso = Hoe = Hsoe = 0), then its reduced density matrix
ρo would evolve into UρoU
† with the same entropy, since
the time-evolution operator U ≡ e−iHot is unitary.
Suppose the subject stays in the state | -¨ 〉 and the
object starts out in the pure state |↑〉. Let the object
Hamiltonian Ho correspond to a magnetic field in the y-
direction causing the spin to precess to the x-direction,
i.e., to the state (|↑〉+|↓〉)/√2. The object density matrix
ρo then evolves into
ρo = U |↑〉〈↑|U† = 1
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉)(〈↑|+ 〈↓|)
=
1
2
(|↑〉〈↑|+ |↑〉〈↓|+ |↓〉〈↑|+ |↓〉〈↓|), (4)
corresponding to the four entries of 1/2 in the second
matrix of Figure 3.
This is quite typical of pure quantum evolution: a ba-
sis state eventually evolves into a superposition of basis
states, and the quantum nature of this superposition is
manifested by off-diagonal elements in ρo. Another fa-
miliar example of this is the familiar spreading out of the
wave packet of a free particle.
2. Effect of Hoe: increasing entropy
This was the effect of Ho alone. In contrast, Hoe will
generally cause decoherence and increase the entropy of
the object. Although decoherence is now well-understood
[48–52], we will briefly review some core results here that
will be needed for the subsequent section about measure-
ment.
Let |oi〉 and |ei〉 denote basis states of the object and
the environment, respectively. As discussed in detail in
[50, 52], decoherence (due to Hoe) tends to occur on
timescales much faster than those on which macroscopic
objects evolve (due to Ho), making it a good approxima-
tion to assume that the unitary dynamics is U ≡ e−iHoet
on the decoherence timescale and leaves the object state
unchanged, merely changing the environment state in a
way that depends on the object state |oi〉, say from an
initial state |e0〉 into some final state |i〉:
U |e0〉|oi〉 = |i〉|oi〉. (5)
This means that the initial density matrix ρ = |e0〉〈e0| ⊗
ρo of the object-environment system, where ρo =∑
ij〈oi|ρo|oj〉|oi〉〈oj |, will evolve as
ρ 7→ UρU† = U |e0〉〈e0|ρoU†
=
∑
ij
〈oi|ρo|oj〉U |e0〉|oi〉〈e0|〈oj |U†
=
∑
ij
〈oi|ρo|oj〉|i〉|oi〉〈j |〈oj |. (6)
The reduced density matrix for the object is this object-
environment density matrix partial-traced over the envi-
ronment, so it evolves as
ρ0 7→ tr eρ ≡
∑
k
〈ek|ρ|ek〉
=
∑
ijk
〈oi|ρo|oj〉〈j |ek〉〈ek|i〉|oi〉〈oj |
=
∑
ij
|oi〉〈oi|ρo|oj〉〈oj |〈j |i〉
=
∑
ij
PiρoPj〈j |i〉, (7)
where we used the identity
∑
k |ek〉〈ek| = I in the
penultimate step and defined the projection operators
Pi ≡ |oi〉〈oi| that project onto the ith eigenstate of the
object. This well-known result implies that if the envi-
ronment can tell whether the object is in state i or j, i.e.,
if the environment reacts differently in these two cases by
ending up in two orthogonal states, 〈j |i〉 = 0, then the
corresponding (i, j)-element of the object density matrix
gets replaced by zero:
ρ0 7→
∑
i
PiρoPi, (8)
corresponding to the so-called von Neumann reduction
[53] which was postulated long before the discovery of
decoherence; we can interpret it as object having been
measured by something (the environment) that refuses
to tell us what the outcome was.2
This suppression of the off-diagonal elements of the
object density matrix is illustrated in Figure 3. In this
example, we have only two object states |o1〉 = |↑〉 and
|o2〉 = |↓〉, two environment states, and an interaction
such that 〈1|2〉 = 0, giving
ρo 7→ 1
2
(|↑〉〈↑|+ |↓〉〈↓|. (9)
This new final state corresponds to the two entries of 1/2
in the third matrix of Figure 3. In short, when the envi-
ronment finds out about the system state, it decoheres.
3. Effect of Hso: decreasing entropy
Whereas Hoe typically causes the apparent entropy of
the object to increase, Hso typically causes it to decrease.
2 Equation (34) is known as the Lu¨ders projection [54] for the more
general case where the Pi are more general projection operators
that still satisfy PiPj = δijPi,
∑
Pi = I. This form also follows
from the decoherence formula (7) for the more general case where
the environment can only tell which group of states the object
is in (because the eigenvalues of Hoe are degenerate within each
group), so that 〈j |i〉 = 1 if i and j belong to the same group
and vanishes otherwise. One then obtains an equation of the
same form as equation (8), but where each projection operator
projects onto one of the groups.
6Figure 3 illustrates the case of an ideal measurement,
where the subject starts out in the state | -¨ 〉 and Hso
is of such a form that the subject gets perfectly corre-
lated with the object. In the language of equation (3), an
ideal measurement is a type of communication where the
mutual information Iso between the subject and object
systems is increased to its maximum possible value[46].
Suppose that the measurement is caused by Hso becom-
ing large during a time interval so brief that we can ne-
glect the effects of Hs and Ho. The joint subject+object
density matrix ρso then evolves as ρso 7→ UρsoU†, where
U ≡ exp [−i ∫ Hsodt]. If observing |↑〉 makes the sub-
ject happy and |↓〉 makes the subject sad, then we have
U | -¨ ↑〉 = | ¨^ ↑〉 and U | -¨ ↓〉 = |_¨↓〉. The state given by
equation (9) would therefore evolve into
ρo =
1
2
U(| -¨ 〉〈 -¨ |)⊗ (|↑〉〈↑|+ |↓〉〈↓|)U† (10)
=
1
2
(U | -¨↑〉〈 -¨↑|U† + U | -¨↓〉〈 -¨↓|U†
=
1
2
(| ¨^ ↑〉〈 ¨^ ↑|+ |_¨↓〉〈_¨↓ |) =
1
2
(ρ©^¨ + ρ©¨_ ) ,
as illustrated in Figure 3, where ρ©^¨ ≡ | ¨^ ↑〉〈 ¨^ ↑| and
ρ©¨_ ≡ |_¨ ↓〉〈_¨ ↓ |. This final state contains a mix-
ture of two subjects, corresponding to definite but oppo-
site knowledge of the object state. According to both of
them, the entropy of the object has decreased from one
bit to zero bits. As mentioned above, there is a sepa-
rate object density matrix ρo corresponding to each of
these two observers. Each of these two observers picks
out her density matrix by conditioning the density ma-
trix of equation (10) on her subject degrees of freedom,
i.e., the density matrix of the happy one is ρ©^¨ and that
of the other one is ρ©¨_ . These are what Everett termed
the “relative states” [46], except that we are expressing
them in terms of density matrices rather than wavefunc-
tions. In other words, a subject by definition has zero
entropy at all times, subjectively knowing her state per-
fectly. Related discussion of the conditioning operation
is given in [43, 44].
In many experimental situations, this projection step
in defining the object density matrix corresponds to the
familiar textbook process of quantum state preparation.
For example, suppose an observer wants to perform a
quantum measurement on a spin 1/2 silver atom in the
state |↑〉. To obtain a silver atom prepared in this state,
she can simply perform the measurement of one atom,
introspect, and if she finds that she is in state | ¨^ 〉, then
she know that her atom is prepared in the desired state
|↑〉— otherwise she discards it and tries again with other
atom until she succeeds. Now she is ready to perform her
experiment.
In cosmology, this state preparation step is often so ob-
vious that it is easy to overlook. Consider for example the
state illustrated in Figure 1 and ask yourself what den-
sity matrix you should use to make predictions for your
own future cosmological observations. All experiments
you can ever perform are preceded by you introspecting
and implicitly confirming that you are not in one of the
stillborn galaxy-free wavefunction branches that failed to
inflate. Since those dead branches are thoroughly deco-
hered from the branch that you are in, they are com-
pletely irrelevant to predicting your future, and it would
be a serious mistake not to discard their contribution to
the density matrix of your universe. This conditionaliza-
tion is analogous to the use of conditional probabilities
when making predictions in classical physics. If you are
playing cards, for example, the probabilistic model that
you make for your opponents hidden cards reflects your
knowledge of your own cards; you do not consider shuf-
fling outcomes where you were dealt different cards than
those you observe.
Just as decoherence can be partial, when 〈j |i〉 6= 0,
so can measurement, so let us now derive how observa-
tion changes the density matrix also in the most general
case. Let |si〉 denote the basis states that the subject can
perceive — as discussed above, these must be robust to
decoherence, and will for the case of a human observer
correspond to “pointer states” [55] of certain degrees of
freedom of her brain. Just as in the decoherence section
above, let us consider general interactions that leave the
object unchanged, i.e., such that the unitary dynamics is
U ≡ e−iHsot during the observation and merely changes
the subject state in a way that depends on the object
state |oi〉, say from an initial state |s0〉 into some final
state |σi〉:
U |s0〉|oi〉 = |σi〉|oi〉. (11)
This means that an initial density matrix ρ =
|s0〉〈s0| ⊗ ρo of the subject-object system, where ρo =∑
ij〈oi|ρo|oj〉|oi〉〈oj |, will evolve as
ρ 7→ UρU† = U |s0〉〈s0|ρoU†
=
∑
ij
〈oi|ρo|oj〉U |s0〉|oi〉〈s0|〈oj |U†
=
∑
ij
〈oi|ρo|oj〉|σi〉|oi〉〈σj |〈oj |. (12)
Since the subject will decohere rapidly, on a timescale
much shorter than that on which subjective perceptions
change, we can apply the decoherence formula (8) to this
expression with Pi = |si〉〈si|, which gives
ρ 7→
∑
k
PkρPk =
∑
k
|sk〉〈sk|ρ|sk〉〈sk|
=
∑
ijk
〈oi|ρo|oj〉〈sk|σi〉〈σj |sk〉|sk〉〈sk| ⊗ |oi〉〈oj |
=
∑
k
|sk〉〈sk| ⊗ ρ(k)o , (13)
where
ρ(k)o ≡
∑
ij
〈oi|ρo|oj〉〈sk|σi〉〈σj |sk〉|oi〉〈oj |
=
∑
ij
PiρoPj〈sk|σi〉〈sk|σj〉∗ (14)
7is the (unnormalized) density matrix that the subject
perceiving |sk〉 will experience. Equation (13) thus de-
scribes a sum of decohered components, each of which
contains the subject in a pure state |sk〉. For the version
of the subject perceiving |sk〉, the correct object density
matrix to use for all its future predictions is therefore
ρ
(k)
o appropriately re-normalized to have unit trace:
ρo 7→ ρ
(k)
o
tr ρ
(k)
o
=
∑
ij PiρoPj〈sk|σi〉〈sk|σj〉∗∑
i tr ρoPi|〈sk|σi〉|2
=
ΠkρΠ
†
k
tr ΠkρΠ
†
k
, (15)
where
Πk =
∑
i
〈sk|σi〉Pi. (16)
This can be thought of as a generalization of Everett’s
so-called relative state from wave functions to density
matrices and from complete to partial measurements. It
can also be thought of as a generalization of Bayes’ The-
orem from the classical to the quantum case: just like
the classical Bayes’ theorem shows how to update an ob-
server’s classical description of something (a probability
distribution) in response to new information, the quan-
tum Bayes’ theorem shows how to update an observer’s
quantum description of something (a density matrix).
We recognize the denominator tr ρ
(k)
o =∑
i〈oi|ρo|oi〉|〈sk|σi〉|2 as the standard expression
for the probability that the subject will perceive |sk〉.
Note that the same final result in equation (15) can
also be computed directly from equation (12) without
invoking decoherence, as ρo 7→ 〈sk|ρ|sk〉/tr 〈sk|ρ|sk〉, so
the role of decoherence lies merely in clarifying why this
is the correct way to compute the new ρo.
To better understand equation (15), let us consider
some simple examples:
1. If 〈si|σj〉 = δij , then we have a perfect measure-
ment in the sense that the subject learns the exact
object state, and equation (15) reduces to ρo 7→ Pk,
i.e.,. the observer perceiving |sk〉 knows that the
object is in its kth eigenstate.
2. If |σi〉 is independent of i, then no information
whatsoever has been transmitted to the subject,
and equation (15) reduces to ρo 7→ ρo, i.e., nothing
changes.
3. If for some subject state k we have 〈si|σj〉 = 1 for
some group of j-values, vanishing otherwise, then
the observer knows only that the object state is in
this group (this can happen if Hso has degenerate
eigenvalues). Equation (15) then reduces to ΠkρΠktr ρΠk
,
where Πk is the projection operator onto this group
of states.
4. Entropy and information
In summary, we see that the object decreases its en-
tropy when it exchanges information with the subject and
increases it when it exchanges information with the envi-
ronment. Since the standard phrasing of the second law
of thermodynamics is focused on the case where interac-
tions with the observer are unimportant, we can rephrase
it in a more nuanced way that explicitly acknowledges
this caveat:
Second law of thermodynamics:
The object’s entropy can’t decrease unless it
interacts with the subject.
We can also formulate an analogous law that focuses
on decoherence and ignores the observation process:
Another law of thermodynamics:
The object’s entropy can’t increase unless it
interacts with the environment.
In Appendix A, we prove the first version and clar-
ify the mathematical status and content of the second
version. Note that for the above version of the second
law, we are restricting the interaction with the environ-
ment to be of a form of equation (5), i.e., to be such
that it does not alter the state of the system, merely
transfers information about it to the environment. In
contrast, if general object-environment interactions Hoe
are allowed, then there are no restrictions on how the
object entropy can change: for example, there is always
an interaction that simply exchanges the state of the ob-
ject with the state of part of the environment, and if the
latter is pure, this interaction will decrease the object
entropy to zero. More physically interesting examples
of entropy-reducing object-environment interactions in-
clude dissipation (which can in some cases purify a high-
energy mixed state to closely approach a pure ground
state) and error correction (for example, where a living
organism reduces its own entropy by absorbing particles
with low entropy from the environment, performing uni-
tary error correction that moves part of its own entropy
to these particles, and finally dumping these particles
back into the environment).
In regard to the other law of thermodynamics above,
note that it is merely on average that interactions with
the object cannot increase the entropy (because of Shan-
non’s famous result that the entropy gives the average
number of bits required to specify an outcome). For cer-
tain individual measurement outcomes, observation can
sometimes increase entropy — we will see an explicit ex-
ample of this in the next section.
For a less cosmological example, consider helium gas in
a thermally insulated box, starting off with the gas par-
ticles in a zero-entropy coherent state, where each atom
is in a rather well-defined position. There are positive
Lyapunov exponents in this system because the momen-
tum transfer in atomic collisions is sensitive to the impact
parameter, so before long, chaotic dynamics has placed
8FIG. 4: Our toy model involves a pixelized space where pixels
are habitable (green/light grey) or uninhabitable (red/dark
grey) at random with probability 50%, except inside large
contiguous inflationary patches where all pixels are habitable.
every gas particle in a superposition of being everywhere
in a box — indeed, in a superposition of being all over
phase space, with a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. If
we define the object to be some small subset of the helium
atoms and call the rest of the atoms the environment,
then the object entropy So will be high (corresponding
to a roughly thermal density matrix ρo ∝ e−H/kT ) even
though the the total entropy Soe remains zero; the differ-
ence between these two entropies reflects the information
that the environment has about the object via quantum
entanglement as per equation (3). In classical thermo-
dynamics, the only way to reduce the entropy of a gas
is to invoke Maxwell’s demon. Our formalism provides a
different way to understand this: the entropy decreases if
you yourself are the demon, obtaining information about
the individual atoms that constitute the object.
III. APPLICATION TO THE INFLATIONARY
ENTROPY PROBLEM
A. A classical toy model
To build intuition for the effect of observation on en-
tropy in inflationary cosmology, let us consider the simple
toy model illustrated in Figure 4. This model is purely
classical, but we will show below how the basic conclu-
sions generalize to the quantum case as well. We will also
see that the qualitative conclusions remain valid when
this unphysical toy model is replaced by realistic infla-
tion scenarios.
Let us imagine an infinite space pixelized into dis-
crete voxels of finite size, each of which can be in only
two states. We will refer to these two states as habit-
able and uninhabitable, and in Figure 4, they are colored
green/light grey and red/dark grey, respectively. We as-
sume that some inflation-like process has created large
habitable patches in this space, which fill a fraction f of
the total volume, and that the rest of space has a com-
pletely random state where each voxel is habitable with
50% probability, independently of the other voxels.
Now consider a randomly selected region (which we
will refer to as a “universe” by analogy with our Hub-
ble volume) of this space, lying either completely in-
side an inflationary patch or completely outside the in-
flationary patches — almost all regions much smaller
than the typical inflationary patch will have this prop-
erty. Let us number the voxels in our region in some or-
der 1, 2, 3, ..., and let us represent each state by a string
of zeroes and ones denoting habitable and uninhabit-
able, where a 0 in the ith position means that the ith
voxel is habitable. For example, if our region contains
30 voxels, then “000000000000000000000000000000” de-
notes the state where the whole region is habitable,
whereas “101101010001111010001100101001” represents
a rather typical non-inflationary state. Finally, we label
each state by an integer i which is simply its bit string
interpreted as a binary number.
Letting n denote the number of voxels in our region,
there are clearly 2n possible states i = 0, ..., 2n − 1 that
it can be in. By our assumptions, the probability pi that
our region is in the ith state (denoted Ai) is
pi ≡ P (Ai) =
{
f + (1− f)2−n if i = 0,
(1− f)2−n if i > 0, (17)
i.e., there is a probability f of being in the i = 0 state
because inflation happened in our region, plus a small
probability 2−n of being in any state in case inflation did
not happen here.
Now suppose that we decide to measure b bits of infor-
mation by observing the state of the first b voxels. The
probability P (H) that they are all habitable is simply
the total probability of the first 2n−b states, i.e.,
P (H) =
2n−b−1∑
i=0
pi = f + (1− f)2−n + (2n−b − 1)(1− f)2−n
= f + (1− f)2−b, (18)
independent of the number of voxels n in our region. This
result is easy to interpret: either we are in an inflationary
region (with probability f), in which case these b voxels
are all habitable, or we are not (with probability 1− f),
in which case they are all habitable with probability 2−b.
If we find that these b voxels are indeed all habitable,
then using the standard formula for conditional proba-
9bilities, we obtain the following revised probability dis-
tribution for the state of our region:
p
(b)
i ≡ P (Ai|H) =
P (Ai&H)
P (H)
=

f+(1−f)2−n
f+(1−f)2−b if i = 0,
(1−f)2−n
f+(1−f)2−b if i = 1, ..., 2
n−b − 1,
0 if i = 2n−b, ..., 2n − 1.
(19)
We are now ready to compute the entropy S of our re-
gion given various degrees of knowledge about it, which
is defined by the standard Shannon formula
S(b) ≡
2n−1∑
i=0
h
[
p
(b)
i
]
, h(p) ≡ −p log p, (20)
where, as mentioned, we use logarithms of base two so
that the entropy has units of bits. Consider first the
simple case of no inflation, f = 0. Then all non-vanishing
probabilities reduce to p
(b)
i = 2
b−n and the entropy is
simply
S(b) = n− b. (21)
In other words, the state initially requires n bits to de-
scribe, one per voxel, and whenever we observe one more
voxel, the entropy drops by one bit: the one bit of infor-
mation we gain tells us merely about the state of the ob-
served voxel, and tells us nothing about the rest of space
since the other voxels are statistically independent.
More generally, substituting equation (19) into equa-
tion (20) gives
S(b) = h
[
f + (1− f)2−n
f + (1− f)2−b
]
+
(
2n−b − 1)h [ (1− f)2−n
f + (1− f)2−b
]
.
(22)
As long as the number of voxels is large (n  b) and
the inflated fraction f is non-negligible (f  2−n), this
entropy is accurately approximated by
S(b) ≈ h
[
f
f + (1− f)2−b
]
+ 2n−bh
[
(1− f)2−n
f + (1− f)2−b
]
(23)
=
n
2bf
1−f + 1
+
h(f) + 2−bh(1− f)
f + (1− f)2−b + log
[
f + (1− f)2−b] .
The sum of the last two terms is merely an n-independent
constant of order unity which approaches zero as we ob-
serve more voxels (as b increases), so in this limit, equa-
tion (23) reduces to simply
S(b) ≈ (f
−1 − 1)n
2b
. (24)
For the special case f = 1/2 where half the volume is
inflationary, equation (23) reduces to the more accurate
result
S(b) ≈ n
2b + 1
+ log[1 + 2−b] (25)
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FIG. 5: How observations change the entropy for an inflation-
ary fraction f = 0.5. If successive voxels are all observed to be
habitable, the entropy drops roughly exponentially in accor-
dance with equation (25) (green/grey dots). If the first voxel
is observed to be uninhabitable, thus establishing that we are
in a non-inflationary region, then the entropy instead shoots
up to the line of slope −1 given by equation (21) (grey/red
squares). More generally, we observe b habitable voxels and
then one uninhabitable one, the entropy first follows the dots,
then jumps up to the squares, then follows the squares down-
ward regardless of what is observed thereafter. This figure
illustrates the case with n = 50 voxels — although n ∼ 10120
is more relevant to our actual universe, the drop toward zero
of the green curve would be too fast to be visible in the such
a plot.
without approximations.
Comparing equation (21) with either of the last two
equations, we notice quite a remarkable difference, which
is illustrated in Figure 5: in the inflationary case, the
entropy decreases not linearly (by one bit for every bit
observed), but exponentially! This means that in our toy
inflationary universe model, if an observer looks around
and finds that even a tiny nearby volume is habitable,
this dramatically reduces the entropy of her universe. For
example, if f = 0.5 and there are 10120 voxels, then the
initial entropy is about 10120 bits, and observing merely
400 voxels (less than a fraction 10−117 of the volume) to
be habitable brings this huge entropy down to less than
one bit.
How can observing a single voxel have such a large
effect on the entropy? The answer clearly involves the
long-range correlations induced by inflation, whereby this
single voxel carries information about whether inflation
occurred or not in all the other voxels in our universe. If
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we observe b  − log f habitable voxels, it is exponen-
tially unlikely that we are not in an inflationary region.
We therefore know with virtual certainty that the vox-
els that we will observe in the future are also habitable.
Since our uncertainty about the state of these voxels has
largely gone away, the entropy must have decreased dra-
matically, as equation (24) confirms.
To gain more intuition for how this works, consider
what happens if we instead observe the first b voxels to
be uninhabitable. Then equation (19) instead makes all
non-vanishing probabilities pi = 2
b−n, and we recover
equation (21) even when f 6= 0. Thus observing merely
the first voxel to be uninhabitable causes the entropy to
dramatically increase, from (1 − f)n to n − 1, roughly
doubling if f = 0.5. We can understand all this by re-
calling Shannon’s famous result that the entropy gives
the average number of bits required to specify an out-
come. If we know that our universe is not inflationary,
then we need a full n bits of information to specify the
state of the n voxels, since they are all independent. If we
know that our universe is inflationary, on the other hand,
then we know that all voxels are habitable, and we need
no further information. Since a a fraction (1− f) of the
universes are non-inflationary, we thus need (1−f)n bits
on average. Finally, to specify whether it is inflationary
or not, we need 1 bit of information if f = 1/2 and more
generally the slightly smaller amount h(f) + h(1 − f),
which is the entropy of a two-outcome distribution with
probabilities f and 1 − f . The average number of bits
needed to specify a universe is therefore
S(0) ≈ (1− f)n+ h(f) + h(1− f), (26)
which indeed agrees with equation (23) when setting b =
0.
In other words, the entropy of our universe before we
have made any observations is the average of a very large
number and a very small number, corresponding to in-
flationary and non-inflationary regions. As soon as we
start observing, this entropy starts leaping towards one
of these two numbers, reflecting our increased knowledge
of which of the two types of region we inhabit.
Finally, we note that the success in this inflationary
explanation of low entropy does not require an extreme
anthropic selection effect where life is a priori highly un-
likely; contrariwise, the probability that our entire uni-
verse is habitable is simply f , and the effect works fine
also when f is of order unity.
B. The quantum case
To build further intuition for the effect of observation
on entropy, let us generalize our toy model to include
quantum mechanics. We thus upgrade each voxel to a 2-
state quantum system, with two orthogonal basis states
denoted |0〉 (“habitable”) and |1〉 (“uninhabitable”). The
Hilbert space describing the quantum state of an n-voxel
region thus has 2n dimensions. We label our 2n basis
states by the same bit strings as earlier, so the state of
the 30-voxel example given in Section III A above would
be written
|ψi〉 = |101101010001111010001100101001〉, (27)
corresponding to basis state i = 759669545. If the region
is inflationary, all its voxels are habitable, so its density
matrix is
ρyes = |000 . . . 0〉〈000 . . . 0| (28)
If it is not inflationary, then we take each voxel to be in
the mixed state
ρ∗ =
1
2
[|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|] , (29)
independently of all the other voxels, and the density
matrix ρno of the whole region is simply a tensor product
of n such single-voxel density matrices. In the general
case that we wish to consider, there is a probability f
that the region is inflationary, so the full density matrix
is
ρ = fρyes + (1− f)ρno (30)
= f |000 . . . 0〉〈000 . . . 0|+ (1− f)ρ∗ ⊗ ρ∗ ⊗ ρ∗ ⊗ . . . ρ∗
Expanding the tensor products, it is easy to show that we
get 2n different terms, and that this full density matrix
can be rewritten in the form
ρ =
2n−1∑
i=0
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|, (31)
where pi are the probabilities given by equation (17).
Now suppose that we, just as in the previous section,
decide to measure b bits of information by observing the
state of the first b voxels and find them all to be habit-
able. To compute the resulting density matrix ρ(b), we
thus condition on our observational results using equa-
tion (15) with the projection matrix P = |0...0〉〈0...0|,
with b occurrences of 0 inside each of the two brackets,
obtaining
ρ(b) =
PρP
trPρP
. (32)
Substituting equation (31) into this expression and per-
forming some straightforward algebra gives
ρ(b) =
2n−1∑
i=0
p
(b)
i |ψi〉〈ψi|, (33)
where p
(b)
i are the probabilities given by equation (19).
We can now compute the quantum entropy S of our re-
gion, which is defined by the standard von Neuman for-
mula
S(b) ≡ trh
[
ρ(b)
]
, h(ρ) ≡ −ρ log ρ, (34)
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where we again use logarithms of base two so that the
entropy has units of bits. This trace is conveniently eval-
uated in the |ψi〉-basis where equation (33) shows that
the density matrix ρ(b) is diagonal, reducing the entropy
to the sum
S(b) ≡
2n−1∑
i=0
h
[
p
(b)
i
]
. (35)
Comparing this with equation (20), we see that this re-
sult is identical to the one we derived for the classical
case. In other words, all conclusions we drew in the pre-
vious section generalize to the quantum-mechanical case
as well.
C. Real-world issues
Although we repeatedly used words like “inflation” and
“inflationary” above, our toy models of course contained
no inflationary physics whatsoever. For example, real
eternal inflation tends to produce a messy spacetime with
significant curvature on scales far beyond the cosmic par-
ticle horizon, not simply large uniform patches embedded
in Euclidean space3, and real inflation has quantum field
degrees of freedom that are continuous rather than simple
qubits. However, it is also clear that our central result re-
garding exponential entropy reduction has a very simple
origin that is independent of such physical details: long-
range entanglement. In other words, the key was simply
that the state of a small region could sometimes reveal
the state of a much larger region around it (in our case,
local smoothness implied large-scale smoothness). This
allowed a handful of measurements in that small region
to, with a non-negligible probability, provide a massive
entropy reduction by revealing that the larger region was
in a very simple state. We saw that the result was so ro-
bust that it did not even matter whether this long-range
entanglement was classical or quantum-mechanical.
It is not merely inflation that produces such long-range
entanglement, but any process that spreads rapidly out-
ward from scattered starting points. To illustrate this
robustness to physics details, consider the alternative ex-
ample where Figure 4 is a picture of bacterial colonies
growing in a Petri dish: the contiguous spread of colonies
creates long-range entanglement, so that observing a
small patch to be colonized makes it overwhelmingly
likely that a much larger region around it is colonized.
Similarly, if you discover that a drop of milk tastes sour,
it is extremely likely that a much larger volume (your
entire milk carton) is sour. A random bacterium in a
3 It is challenging to quantify the inflationary volume fraction f in
such a messy spacetime, but as we saw above, this does not affect
the qualitative conclusions as long as f is not exponentially small
— which appears unlikely given the tendency of eternal inflation
to dominate the total volume produced.
milk carton should thus expect the entire carton to be
sour just like a random cosmologists in a habitable post-
inflationary patch of space should expect her entire Hub-
ble volume to be post-inflationary.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the context of unitary cosmology, we have investi-
gated the time-evolution of the density matrix with which
an observer describes a quantum system, focusing on the
processes of decoherence and observation and how they
change entropy. Let us now discuss some implications of
our results for inflation and quantum gravity research.
A. Implications for inflation
Although inflation has emerged as the most popular
theory for what happened early on, bolstered by im-
proved measurements involving the cosmic microwave
background and other cosmological probes, the case for
inflation is certainly not closed. Aside from issues to do
with measurements [9] and competing theories [10–12],
there are at least four potentially serious problems with
its theoretical foundations, which are arguably interre-
lated:
1. The entropy problem
2. The measure problem
3. The start problem
4. The degree-of-freedom problem
Since we described the entropy problem in the introduc-
tion, let us now briefly discuss the other three. Please
note that we will not aim or claim to solve any of these
three additional problems in the present paper, merely to
highlight them and describe additional difficulties related
to the degree-of-freedom problem.
1. The measure problem
Inflation is generically eternal, producing a messy
spacetime with infinitely many post-inflationary pockets
separated by regions that inflate forever [56–58]. These
pockets together contain an infinite volume and infinitely
many particles, stars and planets. Moreover, certain ob-
servable quantities like the density fluctuation amplitude
that we have observed to be Q ∼ 2× 10−5 in our part of
spacetime [7, 59] take different values in different places.4
Taken together, these two facts create what has become
4 Q depends on how the inflaton field rolled down its potential, so
for a 1-dimensional potential with a single minimum, Q is gener-
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known as the inflationary “measure problem” [8, 13–33]:
the predictions of inflation for certain observable quanti-
ties are not definite numbers, merely probability distri-
butions, and we do not yet know how to compute these
distributions.
The failure to predict more than probability distribu-
tions is of course not a problem per se, as long as we
know how to compute them (as in quantum mechanics).
In inflation, however, there is still no consensus around
any unique and well-motivated framework for computing
such probability distributions despite a major community
effort in recent years. The crux of the problem is that
when we have a messy spacetime with infinitely many
observers who subjectively feel like you, any procedure
to compute the fraction of them who will measure say
one Q-value rather than another will depend on the or-
der in which you count them, just as the fraction of the
integers that are even depends on the order in which you
count them [8]. There are infinitely many such observer
ordering choices, many of which appear reasonable yet
give manifestly incorrect predictions [8, 20, 25, 31, 33],
and despite promising developments, the measure prob-
lem remains open. A popular approach is to count only
the finite number of observers existing before a certain
time t and then letting t → ∞, but this procedure has
turned out to be extremely sensitive to the choice of time
variable t in the spacetime manifold, with no obviously
correct choice [8, 20, 25, 31, 33], The measure problem
has eclipsed and subsumed the so-called fine tuning prob-
lem, in the sense that even the rather special inflaton po-
tential shapes that are required to match observation can
be found in many parts of the a messy multidimensional
inflationary potential suggested by the string landscape
scenario with its 10500 or more distinct minima [60–64],
so the question shifts from asking why our inflaton po-
tential is the way it is to asking what the probability is
of finding yourself in different parts of the landscape.
In summary, until the measure problem is solved, infla-
tion strictly speaking cannot make any testable predic-
tions at all, thus failing to qualify as a scientific theory
in Popper’s sense.
2. The start problem
Whereas the measure problem stems from the end of
inflation (or rather the lack thereof), a second problem
stems from the beginning of inflation. As shown by
Borde, Guth & Vilenkin [65], inflation must have had
a beginning, i.e., cannot be eternal to the past (except
ically different in regions where the field rolled from the left and
from the right. If there potential has more than one dimension,
there is a continuum of options, and if there are multiple min-
ima, there is even the possibility that other effective parameters
(physical “constants”) may differ between different minima, as
in the string theory landscape scenario [60–64].
for the loophole described in [66, 67]), so inflation fails to
provide a complete theory of our origins, and needs to be
supplemented with a theory of what came before. (The
same applies to various ekpyrotic and cyclic universe sce-
narios [65].)
The question of what preceded inflation is wide open,
with proposed answers including quantum tunneling
from nothing [56, 68], quantum tunneling from a “pre-
big-bang” string perturbative vacuum [69, 70] and quan-
tum tunneling from some other non-inflationary state.
Whereas some authors have argued that eternal infla-
tion makes predictions that are essentially independent
of how inflation started, others have argued that this is
not the case [71–73]. Moreover, there is no quantitative
agreement between the probabilities predicted by differ-
ent scenarios, some of which even differ over the sign of
a huge exponent.
The lack of consensus about the start of inflation not
only undermines claims that inflation provides a final an-
swer, but also calls into question whether some of the
claimed successes of inflation really are successes. In the
context of the above-mentioned entropy problem, some
have argued that tunneling into the state needed to start
inflation is just as unlikely as tunneling straight into the
current state of our universe [35, 36], whereas others have
argued that inflation still helps by reducing the amount
of mass that the quantum tunneling event needs to gen-
erate [74].
3. The degree-of-freedom problem
A third problem facing inflation is to quantum-
mechanically understand what happens when a region
of space is expanded indefinitely. We discuss this issue in
detail in Appendix B below, and provide merely a brief
summary here. Quantum gravity considerations suggest
that the number of quantum degrees of freedom N in a
comoving volume V is finite. If N increases as this vol-
ume expands, then we need an additional law of physics
that specifies when and where new degrees of freedom are
created, and into what quantum states they are born. If
N does not increase, on the other hand, life as we know
it may eventually be destroyed in a “Big Snap” when
the increasingly granular nature of space begins to alter
our effective laws of particle physics, much like a rubber
band cannot be stretched indefinitely before the granu-
lar nature of its atoms cause our continuum description
of it to break down. Moreover, in the simplest scenarios
where the number of observers is proportional to post-
inflationary volume, such Big Snap scenarios are already
ruled out by dispersion measurements using gamma ray
bursts. In summary, none of the three logical possibilities
for the number of quantum degrees of freedom N (it is
infinite, it changes, it stays constant) is problem free.
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4. The case for inflation: the bottom line
In summary, the case for inflation will continue to lack
a rigorous foundation until the measure problem, the
start problem and the degree-of-freedom problem have
been solved, so until then, we cannot say for sure whether
inflation solves the entropy problem and adequately ex-
plains our low observed entropy. However, our results
have shown that inflation certainly makes things better.
We have seen that claims to the contrary are based on
an unjustified neglect of the density matrix conditioning
requirement (the third dynamical equation in Table 1),
thus conflating the entropy of the full quantum state with
the entropy of subsystems.
Specifically, we have showed that by producing a quan-
tum state with long-range entanglement, inflation creates
a situation where observations can cause an exponential
decrease in entropy, so that merely a handful of quan-
tum measurements can bring the entropy for our observ-
able universe down into the low range that we in fact
observe. This means that if we assume that sentient ob-
servers require at least a small volume (say enough to fit
a few atoms) of low temperature ( 1016 GeV), then al-
most all sentient observers will find themselves in a post-
inflationary low-entropy universe, and we humans have
no reason to be surprised that we do so as well.
B. Implications for quantum gravity
We saw above that unjustified neglect of the density
matrix conditioning requirement (the third dynamical
equation in Table 1) can lead to incorrect conclusions
about inflation. The bottom line is that we must not
conflate the total density matrix with the density matrix
relevant to us. Interestingly, as we will now describe,
this exact same conflation has led to various incorrect
claims in the the literature about quantum gravity and
dark energy, for example that dark energy is simply back-
reaction from super-horizon quantum fluctuations.
1. Is Gµν ≈ 8piG〈Tµν〉?
Since we lack a complete theory of quantum gravity, we
need some approximation in the interim for how quan-
tum systems gravitate, generalizing the Einstein equa-
tion Gµν = 8piGTµν of General Relativity. A common
assumption in the literature is that to a good approxi-
mation,
Gµν = 8piG〈Tµν〉, (36)
where Gµν on the left-hand-side is the usual classical Ein-
stein tensor specifying spacetime curvature, while 〈Tµν〉
on the right-hand-side denotes the expectation value of
the quantum field theory operator Tµν , i.e., 〈Tµν〉 ≡
tr [ρTµν ], where ρ is the density matrix. Indeed, this
assumption is often (as in some of the examples cited be-
low) made without explicitly stating it, as if its validity
were self-evident.
So is the approximation of equation (36) valid? It
clearly works well in many cases, which is why it contin-
ues to be used. Yet it is equally obvious that it cannot
be universally valid. Consider the the simple example
of inflation with a quadratic potential starting out in a
homogeneous and isotropic quantum state. This state
will qualitatively evolve as in Figure 1, into a quantum
superposition of many macroscopically different states,
some of which correspond to a large semiclassical post-
inflationary universe like ours (each with its planets etc.
in different places). Yet since both the initial quantum
state and the evolution equations have translational and
rotational invariance, the final quantum state will too,
which means that 〈Tµν〉 is homogeneous and isotropic.
But equation (36) then implies that Gµν is homogeneous
and isotropic as well, i.e., that spacetime is exactly de-
scribed by the Friedmann-Robertson-Walker metric. The
easiest way to experimentally rule this out is to stand
on your bathroom scale and note the gravitational force
pulling you down. In this particular branch of the wave-
function there is a planet beneath you, pulling you down-
ward, and it is irrelevant that there are other decohered
branches of the wavefunction where the planet is instead
above you, to your left, to your right, etc., giving an av-
erage force of zero. 〈Tµν〉 is position-independent for the
quantum field density matrix corresponding to the total
state, whereas the relevant density matrix is the one that
is conditioned on your perceptions thus far, which include
the observation that there is a planet beneath you.
The interesting question regarding equation (36) thus
becomes more nuanced: when exactly is it a good approx-
imation? In this spirit, [75] poses two questions: “How
unreliable are expectation values?” and How much spatial
variation should one expect? We have seen above that the
first step toward a correct treatment is to compute the
density matrix conditioned on our observations (the third
dynamic process in Table 1) and use this density matrix
ρ to describe the quantum state. Having done this, the
question of whether equation (36) is accurate basically
boils down to the question of whether the quantum state
is roughly ergodic, i.e., whether a small-scale spatial aver-
age of a typical classical realization is well-approximated
by the quantum ensemble average 〈Tµν〉 ≡ tr [ρTµν ]. This
ergodicity tends to hold for many important cases, in-
cluding the inflationary case where the quantum wave-
functional for the primordial fields in our Hubble vol-
ume is roughly Gaussian, homogeneous and isotropic [14].
Spatial averaging on small scales is relevant because it
tends to have little effect on the gravitational field on
larger spatial scales, which depends mainly on the large-
scale mass distribution, not on the fine details of where
the mass is located. For a detailed modern treatment
of small-scale averaging and its interpretation as “inte-
grating out” UV degrees of freedom, see [76]. Since very
large scales tend to be observable and very small scales
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tend to be unobservable, a useful rule-of-thumb in many
situations is “condition on large scales, trace out small
scales”.
In summary, the popular approximation of equa-
tion (36) is accurate if both of these conditions hold:
1. The spatially fluctuating stress-energy tensor for a
generic branch of the wavefunction can be approx-
imated by its spatial average.
2. The quantum ensemble average can be approxi-
mated by a spatial average for a generic branch
of the wavefunction.
2. Dark energy from superhorizon quantum fluctuations?
The discovery that our cosmic expansion is accelerat-
ing has triggered a flurry of proposed theoretical expla-
nations, most of which involve some form of substance or
vacuum density dubbed dark energy. An alternative pro-
posal that has garnered significant interest is that there
is no dark energy, and that the accelerated expansion is
instead due to gravitational back-reaction from inflation-
ary density perturbations on scales much larger than our
cosmic particle horizon [77, 78]. This was rapidly refuted
by a number of groups [79–82], and a related claim that
superhorizon perturbations can explain away dark energy
[83] was rebutted by [84].
Although these papers mention quantum mechanics
perfunctorily at best (which is unfortunate given that the
origin of inflationary perturbations is a purely quantum-
mechanical phenomenon), a core issue in these refuted
models is precisely the one we have emphasized in this pa-
per: the importance of using the correct density matrix,
conditioned on our observations, rather than a total den-
sity matrix that implicitly involves incorrect averaging —
either quantum “ensemble” averaging as in equation (36)
or spatial averaging. For example, as explained in [84], a
problem with the effective stress-energy tensor 〈Tµν〉 of
[83] is that it involves averaging over regions of space be-
yond our cosmological particle horizon, even though our
observations are limited to our backward lightcone.
Such unjustified spatial averaging is the classical
physics equivalent of unjustified use of the full density
matrix in quantum mechanics: in both cases, we get cor-
rect statistical predictions only if we predict the future
given what we know about the present. Classically, this
corresponds to using conditional probabilities, and quan-
tum mechanically this corresponds to conditioning the
density matrix using the bottom equation of Table 1 —
neither is optional. In classical physics, you shouldn’t ex-
pect to feel comfortable in boiling water full of ice chunks
just because the spatially averaged temperature is luke-
warm. In quantum mechanics, you shouldn’t expect to
feel good when entering water that’s in a superposition
of very hot and very cold. Similarly, if there is no dark
energy and the total quantum state ρ of our spacetime
corresponds to a superposition of states with different
amplitudes for superhorizon modes, then we shouldn’t
expect to perceive a single semiclassical spacetime that
accelerates (as claimed for some models [77, 78]), but
rather to perceive one of many semiclassical spacetimes
from a decohered superposition, all of which decelerate.
Dark energy researchers have also devoted significant
interest to so-called phantom dark energy, which has an
equation of state w < −1 and can lead to a “big rip” a
finite time from now, when the dark energy density and
the cosmic expansion rate becomes infinite, ripping apart
everything we know. The same logical flaw that we high-
lighted above would apply to all attempts to derive such
results by exploiting infrared logarithms in the equations
for density and pressure [85] if they give w < −1 on scales
much larger than our cosmic horizon, or more generally
to talking about “the equation of state of a superhorizon
mode” without carefully spelling out and justifying any
averaging assumptions made.
C. Unitary thermodynamics and the Copenhagen
Approximation
In summary, we have analyzed cosmology assuming
unitary quantum mechanics, using a tripartite partition
into system, observer and environment degrees of free-
dom. We have seen that this generalizes the second law
of thermodynamics to “The system’s entropy can’t de-
crease unless it interacts with the observer, and it can’t
increase unless it interacts with the environment”. Quan-
titatively, the system (“object”) density matrix evolves
according to one of the three equations listed in Table 1
depending on whether the main interaction of the system
is with itself, with the environment or with the observer.
The key results in this paper follow from the third equa-
tion of Table 1, which gives the evolution of the quantum
state under an arbitrary measurement or state prepara-
tion, and can be thought of as a generalization of the
POVM (Positive Operator Valued Measure) formalism
[86, 87].
Informally speaking, the entropy of an object decreases
while you look at it and increases while you don’t [43].
The common claim that entropy cannot decrease simply
corresponds to the approximation of ignoring the subject
in Figure 2, i.e., ignoring measurement. Decoherence is
simply a measurement that you don’t know the outcome
of, and measurement is simply entanglement, a transfer
of quantum information about the system: the decoher-
ence effect on the object density matrix (and hence the
entropy) is identical regardless of whether this measure-
ment is performed by another person, a mouse, a com-
puter or a single particle that encodes information about
the system by bouncing off of it.5 In other words, obser-
5 As described in detail, e.g., [48–52], decoherence is not simply
the suppression of off-diagonal density matrix elements in gen-
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vation and decoherence both share the same first step,
with another system obtaining information about the ob-
ject — the only difference is whether that system is the
subject or the environment, i.e., whether the last step is
conditioning or partial tracing:
• observation = entanglement + conditioning
• decoherence = entanglement + partial tracing
Our formalism assumes only that quantum-mechanics
is unitary and applies even to observers — i.e., we as-
sume that observers are physical systems too, whose con-
stituent particles obey the same laws of physics as other
particles. The issue of how to derive Born rule proba-
bilities in such a unitary world has been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature [45, 46, 89–92] — for thorough
criticism and defense of these derivations, see [93, 94],
and for a subsequent derivation using inflationary cos-
mology, see [95]. The key point of the derivations is
that in unitary cosmology, a given quantum measurement
tends to have multiple outcomes as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, and that a generic rational observer can fruitfully
act as if some non-unitary random process (“wavefunc-
tion collapse”) realizes only one of these outcomes at the
moment of measurement, with a probabilities given by
the Born rule. This means that in the context of unitary
cosmology, what is traditionally called the Copenhagen
Interpretation is more aptly termed the Copenhagen Ap-
proximation: an observer can make the convenient ap-
proximation of pretending that the other decohered wave
function branches do not exist and that wavefunction col-
lapse does exist. In other words, the approximation is
that apparent randomness is fundamental randomness.
In summary, if you are one of the many observers in
Figure 1, you compute the density matrix ρ with which to
best predict your future from the full density matrix by
performing the two complementary operations summa-
rized in Table 1: conditioning on your knowledge (gener-
alized “state preparation”) and partial tracing over the
environment.6
eral, but rather the occurrence of this in the particular basis
of relevance to the observer. This basis is in turn determined
dynamically by decoherence of both the object [48–52] and the
subject [43, 88].
6 Note that the factorization of the Hilbert space into subject, ob-
ject and environment subspaces is different for different branches
of the wavefunction, and that generally no global factorization
exists. If you designate the spin of a particular silver atom to be
your object degree of freedom in this branch of the wavefunction,
then a copy of you in a branch where planet Earth (including you,
your lab and said silver atom) are a light year further north will
settle on a different tripartite partition into subject, object and
environment degrees of freedom. Fortunately, all observers here
on Earth here in this wavefunction branch agree on essentially
the same entropy for our observable universe, which is why we
tend to get a bit sloppy and hubristically start talking about
“the” entropy, as if there were such a thing.
D. Outlook
Using our tripartite decomposition formalism, we
showed that because of the long-range entanglement cre-
ated by cosmological inflation, the cosmic entropy de-
creases exponentially rather than linearly with the num-
ber of bits of information observed, so that a given ob-
server can produce much more negentropy than her brain
can store. Using this result, we argued that as long as
inflation has occurred in a non-negligible fraction of the
volume, almost all sentient observers will find themselves
in a post-inflationary low-entropy Hubble volume, and
we humans have no reason to be surprised that we do
so as well, which solves the so-called inflationary entropy
problem. As detailed in Appendix B, an arguably worse
problem for unitary cosmology involves gamma-ray-burst
constraints on the “Big Snap”, a fourth cosmic dooms-
day scenario alongside the “Big Crunch”, “Big Chill” and
“Big Rip”, where an increasingly granular nature of ex-
panding space modifies our effective laws of physics, ul-
timately killing us.
Our tripartite framework also clarifies when the pop-
ular quantum gravity approximation Gµν ≈ 8piG〈Tµν〉 is
valid, and how problems with recent attempts to explain
dark energy as gravitational backreaction from super-
horizon scale fluctuations can be understood as a failure
of this approximation. In the future, it can hopefully
shed light also on other thorny issues involving quantum
mechanics and macroscopic systems.
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Appendix A: Entropy inequalities for observation
and decoherence
1. Proof that decoherence increases entropy
The decoherence formula from Table 1 says that the
effect of decoherence on the object density matrix ρ is
ρ 7→ ρ ◦E, (A1)
where the matrix E is defined by Eij ≡ 〈j |i〉 and
the symbol ◦ denotes what mathematicians know as the
Schur product. Schur multiplying two matrices simply
corresponds to multiplying their corresponding compo-
nents, i.e., (ρ◦E)ij = ρijEij . Because E is the matrix of
inner products of all the resulting environmental states
|i〉, it is a so-called Gramian matrix and guaranteed to
be positive semidefinite (with only non-negative eigenval-
ues). Because E also has the property that all its diagonal
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elements are unity (Eii ≡ 〈i|i〉 = 1), it is conveniently
thought of as a (complex) correlation matrix.
We wish to prove that decoherence always increases
the entropy S(ρ) ≡ −tr ρ log ρ of the density matrix, i.e.,
that
S(ρ ◦E) ≥ S(ρ), (A2)
for any two positive semidefinite matrices ρ and E such
tr ρ = 1 and Eii = 1, with equality only for the triv-
ial case where ρ ◦ E = ρ, corresponding to the object-
environment interaction having no effect. Since I have
been unable to find a proof of this in the literature, I will
provide a short proof here.
A useful starting point is the Corollary J.2.a in [96]
(their equation 7), which follows from a 1985 theorem by
Bapat and Sunder. If states that
λ(ρ)  λ(ρ ◦E), (A3)
where λ(ρ) denotes the vector of eigenvalues of a matrix
ρ, arranged in decreasing order, and the symbol  de-
notes majorization. A vector with components λ1, ...,λn
majorizes another vector with components µ1, ...,µn if
they have the same sum and
j∑
i=1
λi ≥
j∑
i=1
µi for j = 1, . . . , n, (A4)
i.e., if the partial sums of the latter never beat the for-
mer: λ1 ≥ µ1, λ1 + λ2 ≥ µ1 + µ2, etc. In other words,
the eigenvalues of the density matrix before decoherence
majorize the eigenvalues after decoherence.
Given any two numbers a and b where a > b, let us
define a Robin Hood transformation as one that brings
them closer together while keeping their sum constant:
a 7→ a − c and b 7→ a + c for some constant 0 < c <
(a − b)/2. Reflecting on the definition of  shows that
majorization is a measure of how spread out a set of
numbers are: performing a Robin Hood transformation
on any two elements of a vector will produce a vector that
it majorizes, and the maximally egalitarian vector whose
components are all equal (λi = 1/n) will be majorized
by any other vector of the same length. Conversely, any
vector that is majorized by another can be obtained from
it by a sequence of Robin Hood transformations [96].
It is easy to see that for a function h that is con-
cave (whose second derivative is everywhere negative),
the quantify h(a) + h(b) will increase whenever we per-
form a Robin Hood transformation on a and b. This
implies that
∑n
i=1 h(λi) increases for any Robin Hood
transformation on any pair of elements, and when we
replace the vector of λ-values by any vector that it ma-
jorizes. However, the entropy of a matrix is exactly such
a function of its eigenvalues:
S(ρ) ≡ −tr ρ log ρ =
∑
i
h(λi), (A5)
where the function h(x) = −x log x is concave. This con-
cludes the proof of equation (A2), i.e., of the theorem
that decoherence increases entropy. By making other
concave choices of h, we can analogously obtain other
theorems about the effects of decoherence. For example,
choosing h(x) = −x2 proves that decoherence also in-
creases the linear entropy 1−tr ρ2. Choosing h(x) = log x
proves that decoherence increases the determinant of the
density matrix, since log det ρ =
∑
i log λi.
2. Conjecture that observation reduces expected
entropy
The observation formula from Table 1 can be thought
of as the quantum Bayes Theorem. It says that observing
subject state i changes the object density matrix to
ρ
(i)
jk =
ρjkSijS
∗
ik
pi
, (A6)
where Sij ≡ 〈si|σj〉 and
pi =
∑
j
ρjj |Sij |2 (A7)
can be interpreted as the probability that the subject will
perceive state i. The resulting entropy S(ρ(i)) can be
both smaller and larger than the initial entropy S(ρ), as
simple examples show. However, I conjecture that obser-
vation always decreases entropy on average, specifically,
that ∑
i
piS
(
ρ(i)
)
< S(ρ) (A8)
except for the trivial case where ρ(i) = ρ, where observa-
tion has no effect. The corresponding result for classical
physics holds, and was proven by Claude Shannon: here
average entropy reduction equals the mutual information
between object and subject, which cannot be negative.
For quantum mechanics, however, the situation is more
subtle. For example, for a system of two perfectly entan-
gled qubits, the entropy of the first qubit is S1 = 1 bit
while the mutual information I ≡ S1 +S2−S12 = 2 bits,
so the classical result would suggest that S1 should drop
to the impossible value of −1 bit whereas equation (A8)
shows that it drops to 0 bits. Although I have thus far
been unable to rigorously prove equation (A8), I have
performed extensive numerical tests with random matri-
ces without encountering any counterexamples.
Appendix B: The Degree-of-Freedom Problem and
the Big Snap
Let N denote the number of degrees of freedom in a fi-
nite comoving volume V of space. Does N stay constant
over time, as our universe expands? There are three log-
ically possible answers to this questions, none of which
appears problem free:
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1. Yes
2. No
3. N is infinite, so we don’t need to give a yes or no
answer.
Option 3 has been called into doubt by quantum grav-
ity considerations. First, the fact that our classical notion
of space appears to break down below the Planck scale
rpl ∼ 10−34m calls into question whether N can signif-
icantly exceed V/r3pl, the volume V that we are consid-
ering, measured in Planck units. Second, some versions
of the so-called holographic principle [97] suggest that N
may be smaller still, bounded not by the V/r3pl but by
V 2/3/r2pl, roughly the area of our volume in Planck units.
Let us therefore explore the other two options: 1 and 2.
The hypothesis that degrees of freedom are neither cre-
ated nor destroyed underlies not only quantum mechanics
(in both its standard form and with non-unitary GRW-
like modifications [39]), but classical mechanics as well.
Although quantum degrees of freedom can freeze out at
low temperatures, reducing the “effective” number, this
does not change the actual number, which is simply the
dimensionality of the Hilbert space.
a. Creating degrees of freedom
The holographic principle in its original form [97] sug-
gests option 2, changing N .7 Let us take our comoving
volume V to be our current cosmological particle horizon
volume, also known as our “observable universe”, of ra-
dius ∼ 1026m, giving a holographic bound of N ∼ 10120
degrees of freedom. This exact same comoving volume
was also the horizon volume during inflation, at the spe-
cific time when the largest-scale fluctuations imaged by
the WMAP-satellite [7] left the horizon, but then its ra-
dius was perhaps of order 10−28m, giving a holographic
bound of a measly N ∼ 1012 degrees of freedom. Since
this number is ridiculously low by today’s standards (I
have more bits than that even on my hard disk), new de-
grees of freedom must have been created in the interim
as per option 2.8 But then we totally lack a predictive
theory of physics! To remedy this, we would need a the-
ory predicting both when and where these new degrees
of freedom are created, and also what quantum states
they are created with. Such a theory would also need
to explain how degrees of freedom disappear when space
contracts, as during black hole formation. Although some
7 More recent versions of the holographic principle have focused on
the entropy of 3D light-sheets rather than 3D volumes, evading
the implications below[98, 99].
8 An even more extreme example occurs if a Planck-scale region
with a mere handful of degrees of freedom generates a whole new
universe with say 10120 degrees of freedom via the Farhi-Guth-
Guven mechanism [100].
interesting early work in this direction has been pursued
(see e.g.[101]), it appears safe to say that no complete
self-consistent theory of this type has yet been proposed
that purports to describe all of physical reality.
b. The Big Snap
This leaves option 1, constant N . It too has received
indirect support from quantum gravity research, in this
case the AdS/CFT correspondence, which suggests that
quantum gravity is not merely degree-of-freedom preserv-
ing but even unitary. This option suffers from a different
problem which I have emphasized to colleagues for some
time, and which I will call the Big Snap.
IfN remains constant as our comoving volume expands
indefinitely, then the number of degrees of freedom per
unit volume drops toward zero9 as N/V . Since a rubber
band consists of a finite number of atoms, it will snap
if you stretch it too much. Similarly, if our space has a
finite number of degrees of freedom N and is stretched
indefinitely, something bad is guaranteed to happen even-
tually.
As opposed to the rubber band case, we do not know
precisely what this “Big Snap” will be like or precisely
when it will occur. However, it is instructive to consider
the length scale a ≡ (V/N)1/3: if the degrees of freedom
are in some sense rather uniformly distributed through-
out space, then a can be thought of as the characteristic
distance between degrees of freedom, and we might ex-
pect some form of spatial granularity to manifest itself on
this scale. As the universe expands, a grows by the same
factor as to the cosmic scale factor, pushing this gran-
ularity to larger scales. It is hard to imagine business
as usual once a ∼> 1026m so that the number of degrees
of freedom in our Hubble volume has dropped below 1.
However, it is likely that our universe will become unin-
habitable long before that, perhaps when the number of
degrees of freedom per atom drops below 1 (a ∼> 1−10m,
altering atomic physics) or the number of degrees of free-
dom per proton drops below 1 (a ∼> 1−15m, altering nu-
clear physics). This Big Snap thus plays a role similar
to that of the cutoff hypersurface used to tackle the in-
flationary measure problem, endowing the “end of time”
proposal of [105] with an actual physical mechanism.
Fortunately, there are observational bounds on many
types of spatial granularity from astronomical observa-
tions. For a simple lattice with spacing a, the linear
9 Some interesting models evade this conclusion by denying that
the physically existing volume can ever expand indefinitely while
remaining completely “real” in some sense. De Sitter Equilib-
rium cosmology [102, 103] can be given the radical interpreta-
tion that once objects leave our cosmic de Sitter horizon, they
no longer have an existence independent of what remains inside
our horizon, and some holographic cosmology models have re-
lated interpretations [104].
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dispersion relation ω(k) = ck for light gets replaced by
ω(k) ∝ sin(ak), giving a group velocity
v =
dω
dk
∝ cos ak ≈ 1− (ak)
2
2
= 1− 1
2
(
aE
~c
)2
(B1)
as long as a  k−1. This means that if two gamma-
ray photons with energies E1 and E2 are emitted si-
multaneously a cosmological distance c/H away, where
H−1 ∼ 1017s is the Hubble time, they will reach us sep-
arated in time by an amount
∆t ∼ H−1 ∆v
v
∼ H−1
(
a∆E
~c
)2
(B2)
if the energy difference ∆E ≡ |E2 − E1| is of the same
order as E1. Structure on a time-scale of 10
−4s has been
reported in the gamma-ray burst GRB 910711 [106] in
multiple energy bands, which [107] interpret as a lower
bound ∆t ∼< 0.01 s for ∆E = 200 keV. Substituting this
into equation (B2) therefore gives the constraint
a < aGRB ∼ ~c
∆E
(H∆t)1/2 ∼ 10−21 m. (B3)
If N really is finite, then we can consider the fate of
a hypersurface during the early stages of inflation that
is defined by a = a∗ for some constant a∗. Each region
along this hypersurface has its own built-in self-destruct
mechanism, in the sense that it can only support ob-
servers like us until it has expanded by a factor a†/a∗,
where a† is the a-value beyond which life as we know it
is impossible. However, in the eternal inflation scenario,
which has been argued to be generic [56–58], different
regions will expand by different amounts before inflation
ends, so we should expect the probability to find our-
selves in a given region ∼ 1017 seconds after the end of
inflation to be proportional to (a/a∗)3 as long as a < a†,
i.e., proportional to the volume of the region and hence
to the number of solar systems in the region (at least for
all regions that share our effective laws of physics). This
predicts that generic observers should have a drawn from
the probability distribution
f(a) =
{
4a3
a4†
if a < a†,
0 if a ≥ a†.
(B4)
The tight observational constraints in equation (B3) are
thus very surprising: even if we conservatively assume
a† = 10−19m, i.e., that a needs to be 10000 times smaller
than a proton for us to survive, the probability of observ-
ing a < aGRB is merely
P (a ≤ aGRB) =
∫ aGRB
0
f(a)da =
(
aGRB
a†
)4
∼ 10−8,
(B5)
thus ruling out this scenario at 99.999999% confidence.
Differently put, the scenario is ruled out because it pre-
dicts that a typical (median) observer has only a couple
of billion years left until the Big Snap, and has already
seen the tell-tale signature of our impending doom in
gamma-ray burst data.
This argument should obviously be taken with a grain
of salt; for example, one can imagine alternative disper-
sion relations which weaken the bound in equation (B3).
However, to be acceptable, any future theory predicting
a finite unchanging number of degrees of freedom N must
repeat this calculation using its own formalism and suc-
cessfully explain why we do not observer greater time
dispersion in gamma-ray bursts.
Another important caveat is that our space is not ex-
panding uniformly: indeed, gravitationally bound regions
like our Galaxy are not expanding at all. In specific
models where the degrees of freedom are localized on
spatial scales smaller than galaxies, one could imagine
galaxy-dwelling observers happily surviving long after
intergalactic space has undergone a Big Snap, as long
as deleterious effects from these faraway regions do not
propagate into the galaxies. Note, however, that this sce-
nario saves only the observers, not the underlying theory.
Indeed, the discrepancy between theory and observation
merely gets worse: repeating the above volume weight-
ing argument now predicts that we are most likely to find
ourselves alive and well in a galaxy after the Big Snap
has taken place throughout most of space, so the lack
of any strange observed signatures in light from distant
extragalactic sources (energy-dependent arrival time dif-
ferences for gamma-ray bursts, say) becomes even harder
to explain.
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